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1 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
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2 object
объект, предмет, изображение объекта, конечный, выходной, объектный
– object approach
– object classification
– object data
– object description
– object file
– object form
– object identification
– object level control
– object presentation
– object program
– object region
– object structure
– object transfer
– object type
– object vertex
– object-centered coordinate frame
– object-level knowledge
– object-oriented programming language
– object-related misconception
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3 Knowledge Engineering Environment
Dictionary English-German Informatics > Knowledge Engineering Environment
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4 knowledge object
Вычислительная техника: объект знаний (в управлении базами знаний) -
5 knowledge-base object
SAP.тех. объект базы знаний -
6 object-level knowledge
Англо-русский словарь по робототехнике > object-level knowledge
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7 object of knowledge
Англо-русский словарь по исследованиям и ноу-хау > object of knowledge
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8 connection object
"An Active Directory object that represents a replication connection from one domain controller to another. The connection object is a child of the replication destinations NTDS Settings object and identifies the replication source server, contains a replication schedule, and specifies a replication transport. Connection objects are created automatically by the Knowledge Consistency Checker (KCC), but they can also be created manually. Automatically generated connections must not be modified by the user unless they are first converted into manual connections." -
9 jnana (In Hindu philosophy, knowledge that is a total experience of its object, particularly the supreme being or reality)
Религия: джнянаУниверсальный англо-русский словарь > jnana (In Hindu philosophy, knowledge that is a total experience of its object, particularly the supreme being or reality)
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10 KO
1) Разговорное выражение: нокаут, нокаутировать2) Спорт: Kick Out3) Военный термин: Kills Others, King's Own4) Техника: kicked-off, klystron oscillator5) Сокращение: Korean, knockout, kickoff (relay), Coca-Cola Company (символ акций), Kelly Ordnance (ammunition headstamp -.50 Caliber), Keystone Oaks (средняя школа в Пенсильвании), Knight Online (MMORPG), kemetic orthodoxy, kick off, kilo octet, knight officer, knowledge object, knowledge officer7) Нефть: kicked off, knocked out, отсепарированный (о газе; knock-out), резко изменивший направление (о стволе скважины, kicked-off)8) Транспорт: Key Offroad9) Бурение: kicked off (deviated)10) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: knockout (as in KO drum)11) Сахалин Р: Knock Out12) Химическое оружие: Contracting Officer13) Имена и фамилии: Kelsey Osburn14) Чат: Kiss Off15) NYSE. Coca Cola Company -
11 Ko
1) Разговорное выражение: нокаут, нокаутировать2) Спорт: Kick Out3) Военный термин: Kills Others, King's Own4) Техника: kicked-off, klystron oscillator5) Сокращение: Korean, knockout, kickoff (relay), Coca-Cola Company (символ акций), Kelly Ordnance (ammunition headstamp -.50 Caliber), Keystone Oaks (средняя школа в Пенсильвании), Knight Online (MMORPG), kemetic orthodoxy, kick off, kilo octet, knight officer, knowledge object, knowledge officer7) Нефть: kicked off, knocked out, отсепарированный (о газе; knock-out), резко изменивший направление (о стволе скважины, kicked-off)8) Транспорт: Key Offroad9) Бурение: kicked off (deviated)10) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: knockout (as in KO drum)11) Сахалин Р: Knock Out12) Химическое оружие: Contracting Officer13) Имена и фамилии: Kelsey Osburn14) Чат: Kiss Off15) NYSE. Coca Cola Company -
12 ko
1) Разговорное выражение: нокаут, нокаутировать2) Спорт: Kick Out3) Военный термин: Kills Others, King's Own4) Техника: kicked-off, klystron oscillator5) Сокращение: Korean, knockout, kickoff (relay), Coca-Cola Company (символ акций), Kelly Ordnance (ammunition headstamp -.50 Caliber), Keystone Oaks (средняя школа в Пенсильвании), Knight Online (MMORPG), kemetic orthodoxy, kick off, kilo octet, knight officer, knowledge object, knowledge officer7) Нефть: kicked off, knocked out, отсепарированный (о газе; knock-out), резко изменивший направление (о стволе скважины, kicked-off)8) Транспорт: Key Offroad9) Бурение: kicked off (deviated)10) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: knockout (as in KO drum)11) Сахалин Р: Knock Out12) Химическое оружие: Contracting Officer13) Имена и фамилии: Kelsey Osburn14) Чат: Kiss Off15) NYSE. Coca Cola Company -
13 use
I [juːs]1) U (act of using) (of substance, object, machine) uso m., impiego m., utilizzo m.; (of word, language) uso m.for use as, in — da essere utilizzato come, in
for the use of — riservato a [customer, staff]
for use by sb. — a uso di qcn.
to make use of sth. — usare o utilizzare qcs., fare uso di qcs.
to make good use of sth., to put sth. to good use — fare buon uso di qcs.
a word in common o general use una parola d'uso corrente; out of o no longer in use [ machine] (broken) guasto, fuori uso; (because obsolete) non più in uso; [word, expression] che non viene più usato, in disuso; worn with use logorato dall'uso; stained with use sporco per l'uso; this machine came into use in the 1950s questa macchina è stata introdotta negli anni '50; the new system comes into use next year — il nuovo sistema entrerà in uso dal prossimo anno
2) С (way of using) (of resource, object, material) utilizzo m., impiego m.; (of term) uso m.to have no further use for sth., sb. — non avere più bisogno di qcs., qcn.
3) U (right to use)to have the use of — avere l'uso di [house, garden, kitchen]; avere il permesso di usare [ car]
with use of — con uso di [ kitchen]
4) U (usefulness)to be of use — essere utile (to a)
to be (of) no use to sb. — [ object] non essere di nessuna utilità per qcn.; [ person] non essere di nessun aiuto a qcn.
oh, what's the use? — oh, tanto a che serve?
II [juːz]it's no use, we'll have to start — niente da fare, dobbiamo cominciare
1) (employ) usare [object, car, room, money, word]; usare, utilizzare [method, tool, technique]; usare, servirsi di [language, metaphor]; sfruttare [ opportunity]; usare, fare ricorso a [blackmail, force]; usare, sfruttare [knowledge, talent, influence]to use sth., sb. as sth. — servirsi di qcs., qcn. come qcs.
to use sth. for sth., to do — usare qcs. per qcs., per fare
use your head! — colloq. usa la testa!
4) (take habitually) fare uso di [ drugs]5) ant. (treat)to use sb. well, ill — trattare bene, male qcn
•- use up* * *I [ju:z] verb1) (to employ (something) for a purpose: What did you use to open the can?; Use your common sense!)2) (to consume: We're using far too much electricity.)•- usable- used
- user
- user-friendly
- user guide
- be used to something
- be used to
- used to II [ju:s]1) (the act of using or state of being used: The use of force to persuade workers to join a strike cannot be justified; This telephone number is for use in emergencies.)2) (the/a purpose for which something may be used: This little knife has plenty of uses; I have no further use for these clothes.)3) ((often in questions or with negatives) value or advantage: Is this coat (of) any use to you?; It's no use offering to help when it's too late.)4) (the power of using: She lost the use of her right arm as a result of the accident.)5) (permission, or the right, to use: They let us have the use of their car while they were away.)•- useful- usefulness
- usefully
- useless
- be in use
- out of use
- come in useful
- have no use for
- it's no use
- make good use of
- make use of
- put to good use
- put to use* * *I [juːs]1) U (act of using) (of substance, object, machine) uso m., impiego m., utilizzo m.; (of word, language) uso m.for use as, in — da essere utilizzato come, in
for the use of — riservato a [customer, staff]
for use by sb. — a uso di qcn.
to make use of sth. — usare o utilizzare qcs., fare uso di qcs.
to make good use of sth., to put sth. to good use — fare buon uso di qcs.
a word in common o general use una parola d'uso corrente; out of o no longer in use [ machine] (broken) guasto, fuori uso; (because obsolete) non più in uso; [word, expression] che non viene più usato, in disuso; worn with use logorato dall'uso; stained with use sporco per l'uso; this machine came into use in the 1950s questa macchina è stata introdotta negli anni '50; the new system comes into use next year — il nuovo sistema entrerà in uso dal prossimo anno
2) С (way of using) (of resource, object, material) utilizzo m., impiego m.; (of term) uso m.to have no further use for sth., sb. — non avere più bisogno di qcs., qcn.
3) U (right to use)to have the use of — avere l'uso di [house, garden, kitchen]; avere il permesso di usare [ car]
with use of — con uso di [ kitchen]
4) U (usefulness)to be of use — essere utile (to a)
to be (of) no use to sb. — [ object] non essere di nessuna utilità per qcn.; [ person] non essere di nessun aiuto a qcn.
oh, what's the use? — oh, tanto a che serve?
II [juːz]it's no use, we'll have to start — niente da fare, dobbiamo cominciare
1) (employ) usare [object, car, room, money, word]; usare, utilizzare [method, tool, technique]; usare, servirsi di [language, metaphor]; sfruttare [ opportunity]; usare, fare ricorso a [blackmail, force]; usare, sfruttare [knowledge, talent, influence]to use sth., sb. as sth. — servirsi di qcs., qcn. come qcs.
to use sth. for sth., to do — usare qcs. per qcs., per fare
use your head! — colloq. usa la testa!
4) (take habitually) fare uso di [ drugs]5) ant. (treat)to use sb. well, ill — trattare bene, male qcn
•- use up -
14 use
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━1. noun━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━1. nouna. ( = act of using) utilisation f• care is necessary in the use of chemicals il faut prendre des précautions quand on utilise des produits chimiques► for + use• to go out of use tomber en désuétude► to make good use of sth [+ time, money] faire bon usage de qch ; [+ opportunity, facilities] tirer parti de qch• to put sth to good use [+ time, money] faire bon usage de qch ; [+ opportunity, facilities] mettre qch à profitb. ( = way of using) it has many uses cela a de nombreux usagesc. ( = usefulness) utilité f• oh, what's the use? (inf) à quoi bon ?• is this (of) any use to you? est-ce que cela peut vous être utile ?• it's no use, he won't listen (inf) ça ne sert à rien, il ne veut rien entendred. ( = ability to use, access) usage ma. ( = make use of) [+ object, tool] se servir de, utiliser ; [+ force] utiliser ; [+ opportunity] profiter de ; [+ method] employer ; [+ drugs] prendre• are you using this? vous servez-vous de ceci ?• use your eyes! sers-toi de tes yeux !b. ( = use up) utiliser (tout)• have you used all the paint? avez-vous utilisé toute la peinture ?• what did he use to do on Sundays? (inf) qu'est-ce qu'il faisait (d'habitude) le dimanche ?━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━✦ Lorsque use est un nom, le se final se prononce s: ju:s, lorsque c'est un verbe, il se prononce z: ju:z, sauf dans les expressions use to ou used to, où se et sed se prononcent s et st: ju:s, ju:st.━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━► use up [ju:zˈʌp]* * *1. [juːs]1) [U] ( act of using) (of substance, object, machine) emploi m, utilisation f (of de); (of word, expression, language) emploi m, usage m (of de)the use of force — le recours à la force, l'usage de la force
the use of something as/for something — l'emploi or l'utilisation de quelque chose comme/pour quelque chose
for the use of somebody —
for use by somebody — (customer, staff) à l'usage de quelqu'un
to put something to good use —
while the machine is in use — lorsque la machine est en service or en fonctionnement
a word in common ou general use — un mot d'usage courant
out of ou no longer in use — [machine] ( broken) hors service; ( because obsolete) plus utilisé; [word, expression] plus en usage
this machine came into use in the 1950s — cette machine a fait son apparition pendant les années cinquante
2) [C] ( way of using) (of resource, object, material) utilisation f; ( of term) emploi mto have no further use for something/somebody — ne plus avoir besoin de quelque chose/quelqu'un
3) ( right to use)to have the use of — avoir l'usage de [house, car, kitchen]; avoir la jouissance de [garden]
to lose/still have the use of one's legs — perdre/conserver l'usage de ses jambes
with use of — avec usage de [kitchen]
4) ( usefulness)to be of use — être utile (to à)
to be (of) no use — [object] ne servir à rien; [person] n'être bon à rien
to be (of) no use to somebody — [object] ne pas servir à quelqu'un; [person] n'être d'aucune utilité à quelqu'un
2. [juːz]oh, what's the use? — oh, et puis à quoi bon?
transitive verb1) ( employ) se servir de, utiliser [object, car, room, money, tool]; employer, utiliser [method]; employer [word, expression]; profiter de, saisir [opportunity]; faire jouer [influence]; avoir recours à [blackmail, force, power]; utiliser [knowledge, talent]to use something/somebody as something — se servir de quelque chose/quelqu'un comme quelque chose
to use something for something/to do — se servir de or utiliser quelque chose pour quelque chose/pour faire
to be used for something/to do — servir à quelque chose/à faire, être utilisé pour quelque chose/pour faire
use your head ou loaf! — (colloq) fais marcher un peu ta cervelle! (colloq)
I could use (colloq) a drink! — j'aurais bien besoin d'un verre!
3) ( exploit) péj se servir de [person]4) ( take habitually) prendre [drugs]3.used past participle adjective [car] d'occasion; [crockery] salePhrasal Verbs:- use up -
15 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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16 Psychology
We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)"Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology
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17 to
1.go to work/to the theatre — zur Arbeit/ins Theater gehen
to Paris/France — nach Paris/Frankreich
throw the ball to me — wirf mir den Ball zu
2) (towards a condition or quality) zu3) (as far as) bis zufrom London to Edinburgh — von London [bis] nach Edinburgh
increase from 10 % to 20 % — von 10 % auf 20 % steigen
with one's back to the wall — mit dem Rücken zur Wand
5) (implying comparison, ratio, etc.)[compared] to — verglichen mit; im Vergleich zu
it's ten to one he does something — die Chancen stehen zehn zu eins, dass er etwas tut
6) introducing relationship or indirect objectto somebody/something — jemandem/einer Sache (Dat.)
lend/explain etc. something to somebody — jemandem etwas leihen/erklären usw.
relate to something — sich auf etwas (Akk.) beziehen
secretary to the Minister — Sekretär des Ministers
that's all there is to it — mehr ist dazu nicht zu sagen
what's that to you? — was geht das dich an?
7) (until) bisto the end — bis zum Ende
five [minutes] to eight — fünf [Minuten] vor acht
8) with infinitive of a verb zu; expressing purpose, or after academic.ru/75540/too">too um [...] zutoo young to marry — zu jung, um zu heiraten; zu jung zum Heiraten
to rebel is pointless — es ist sinnlos zu rebellieren
he woke to find himself in a strange room — er erwachte und fand sich in einem fremden Zimmer wieder
he would have phoned but forgot to — er hätte angerufen, aber er vergaß es
2.she didn't want to go there, but she had to — sie wollte nicht hingehen, aber sie musste
[tuː] adverb1) (just not shut)be to — [Tür, Fenster:] angelehnt sein
2)* * *1. [tə,tu] preposition1) (towards; in the direction of: I cycled to the station; The book fell to the floor; I went to the concert/lecture/play.) zu, auf2) (as far as: His story is a lie from beginning to end.) bis3) (until: Did you stay to the end of the concert?) bis4) (sometimes used to introduce the indirect object of a verb: He sent it to us; You're the only person I can talk to.) zu, mit5) (used in expressing various relations: Listen to me!; Did you reply to his letter?; Where's the key to this door?; He sang to (the accompaniment of) his guitar.) zu, für6) (into a particular state or condition: She tore the letter to pieces.) in7) (used in expressing comparison or proportion: He's junior to me; Your skill is superior to mine; We won the match by 5 goals to 2.) gegenüber, zu8) (showing the purpose or result of an action etc: He came quickly to my assistance; To my horror, he took a gun out of his pocket.) zu9) ([tə] used before an infinitive eg after various verbs and adjectives, or in other constructions: I want to go!; He asked me to come; He worked hard to (= in order to) earn a lot of money; These buildings were designed to (= so as to) resist earthquakes; She opened her eyes to find him standing beside her; I arrived too late to see him.) zu, um zu10) (used instead of a complete infinitive: He asked her to stay but she didn't want to.) zu2. [tu:] adverb1) (into a closed or almost closed position: He pulled/pushed the door to.) zu2) (used in phrasal verbs and compounds: He came to (= regained consciousness).) zu sich, dran•* * *to[tu:, tu, tə]I. PREPOSITION, nach + dat, zu + datshe walked over \to the window sie ging [hinüber] zum Fenster [o ans Fenster]we're going \to town wir gehen/fahren in die Stadtthey go \to work on the bus sie fahren mit dem Bus zur ArbeitI'm going \to a party/concert ich gehe auf eine Party/ein Konzertshe has to go \to a meeting now sie muss jetzt zu einem Meeting [gehen]we moved \to Germany last year wir sind letztes Jahr nach Deutschland gezogenhe flew \to the US er flog in die USAshe's never been \to Mexico before sie ist noch nie [zuvor] in Mexiko gewesenmy first visit \to Africa mein erster Aufenthalt in Afrikathis is a road \to nowhere! diese Straße führt nirgendwohin!parallel \to the x axis parallel zur x-Achsefrom here \to the station von hier [bis] zum Bahnhofon the way \to the mountains/the sea/the town centre auf dem Weg in die Berge/zum Meer/ins [o zum] Stadtzentrum\to the north/south nördlich/südlichtwenty miles \to the north of the city zwanzig Meilen nördlich der Stadtthe suburbs are \to the west of the city die Vororte liegen im Westen der Stadtfrom place \to place von Ort zu Ort\to the right/left nach rechts/linksthere \to the right dort rechtshe's standing \to the left of Adrian er steht links neben Adrian, in + datshe goes \to kindergarten sie geht in den Kindergartenhe goes \to university er geht auf die Universitätdo you go \to church? gehst du in die Kirche?I go \to the gym twice a week ich gehe zweimal wöchentlich zum Fitnessan invitation \to a wedding eine Einladung zu einer HochzeitI've asked them \to dinner ich habe sie zum Essen eingeladenshe took me out \to lunch yesterday sie hat mich gestern zum Mittagessen ausgeführt [o eingeladenshe pointed \to a distant spot on the horizon sie zeigte auf einen fernen Punkt am Horizontto have one's back \to sth/sb etw/jdm den Rücken zudrehenback \to front verkehrt herumthey were dancing cheek \to cheek sie tanzten Wange an Wangeshe put her hand \to his breast sie legte die Hand auf seine Brustshe clasped the letter \to her bosom sie drückte den Brief an ihre Brusttie the lead \to the fence mach die Leine am Zaun festthey fixed the bookshelves \to the wall sie brachten die Bücherregale an der Wand anstick the ads \to some paper klebe die Anzeigen auf ein Blatt Papier7. (with indirect object)I lent my bike \to my brother ich habe meinem Bruder mein Fahrrad geliehengive that gun \to me gib mir das Gewehrchildren are often cruel \to each other Kinder sind oft grausam zueinanderwho's the letter addressed \to? an wen ist der Brief adressiert?what have they done \to you? was haben sie dir [an]getan?her knowledge proved useful \to him ihr Wissen erwies sich als hilfreich für ihnthey made a complaint \to the manager sie reichten beim Geschäftsleiter eine Beschwerde eina threat \to world peace eine Bedrohung des Weltfriedens [o für den Weltfrieden]to be grateful \to sb jdm dankbar seinto be married \to sb mit jdm verheiratet seinto tell/show sth \to sb jdm etw erzählen/zeigenand what did you say \to that? und was hast du dazu gesagt?he finally confessed \to the crime er gestand schließlich das Verbrechenthis is essential \to our strategy dies ist ein wesentlicher Bestandteil unserer Strategiea reference \to Psalm 22:18 ein Verweis auf Psalm 22:18her reply \to the question ihre Antwort auf die Frageand what was her response \to that? und wie lautete ihr Antwort darauf?the keys \to his car seine Autoschlüsselthe top \to this pen die Kappe, die auf diesen Stift gehörtshe has a mean side \to her sie kann auch sehr gemein seinthere is a very moral tone \to this book dieses Buch hat einen sehr moralischen Untertonthere's a funny side \to everything alles hat auch seine komische SeiteI prefer beef \to seafood ich ziehe Rindfleisch Meeresfrüchten vorshe looked about thirty \to his sixty neben ihm mit seinen sechzig Jahren wirkte sie wie dreißigto be comparable \to sth mit etw dat vergleichbar sein[to be] nothing \to sth nichts im Vergleich zu etw dat [sein]her wage is nothing \to what she could earn ihr Einkommen steht in keinem Vergleich zu dem, was sie verdienen könnteto be superior \to sb jdm übergeordnet sein, höher stehen als jdPaul beat me by three games \to two Paul hat im Spiel drei zu zwei gegen mich gewonnenManchester won three \to one Manchester hat drei zu eins gewonnen, zu + datI read up \to page 100 ich habe bis Seite 100 gelesenunemployment has risen \to almost 8 million die Arbeitslosigkeit ist auf fast 8 Millionen angestiegencount \to 20 zähle bis 20it's about fifty miles \to New York es sind [noch] etwa fünfzig Meilen bis New Yorkhe converted \to Islam er ist zum Islam übergetretenhis expression changed from amazement \to joy sein Ausdruck wechselte von Erstaunen zu Freudethe change \to the metric system der Wechsel zum metrischen Systemher promotion \to department manager ihre Beförderung zur Abteilungsleiterinthe meat was cooked \to perfection das Fleisch war bestens zubereitethe drank himself \to death er trank sich zu Todeshe nursed me back \to health sie hat mich [wieder] gesund gepflegtsmashed \to pieces in tausend Stücke geschlagenshe was close \to tears sie war den Tränen nahehe was thrilled \to bits er freute sich wahnsinnigthe shop is open \to 8.00 p.m. der Laden hat bis 20 Uhr geöffnetwe're in this \to the end wir führen dies bis zum Endeand \to this day... und bis auf den heutigen Tag...it's only two weeks \to your birthday! es sind nur noch zwei Wochen bis zu deinem Geburtstag!16. (including)▪ from... \to... von... bis...from beginning \to end von Anfang bis Endefrom morning \to night von morgens bis abendsfront \to back von vorne bis hinten, von allen SeitenI read the document front \to back ich habe das Dokument von vorne bis hinten gelesenhe's done everything from snowboarding \to windsurfing er hat von Snowboarden bis Windsurfen alles [mal] gemachtfrom simple theft \to cold-blooded murder vom einfachen Diebstahl bis zum kaltblütigen Mordit's twenty \to six es ist zwanzig vor sechs\to my relief/horror/astonishment zu meiner Erleichterung/meinem Entsetzen/meinem Erstaunenmuch \to her surprise zu ihrer großen Überraschung\to me, it sounds like she's ending the relationship für mich hört sich das an, als ob sie die Beziehung beenden wolltethat outfit looks good \to me das Outfit gefällt mir gutif it's acceptable \to you wenn Sie einverstanden sindthis would be \to your advantage das wäre zu deinem Vorteil, das wäre für dich von Vorteildoes this make any sense \to you? findest du das auf irgendeine Weise einleuchtend?fifty pounds is nothing \to him fünfzig Pfund sind nichts für ihnwhat's it \to you? ( fam) was geht dich das an?he works as a personal trainer \to the rich and famous er arbeitet als Personal Trainer für die Reichen und Berühmtenthey are hat makers \to Her Majesty the Queen sie sind Hutmacher Ihrer Majestät, der Königineconomic adviser \to the president Wirtschaftsberater des Präsidentenshe was Ophelia \to Olivier's Hamlet in der Verfilmung von Olivier spielte sie neben Hamlet die Opheliahere's \to you! auf dein/Ihr Wohl!\to the cook! auf den Koch/die Köchin!the record is dedicated \to her mother die Schallplatte ist ihrer Mutter gewidmetI propose a toast \to the bride and groom ich bringe einen Toast auf die Braut und den Bräutigam ausa memorial \to all the soldiers who died in Vietnam ein Denkmal für alle im Vietnamkrieg gefallenen Soldaten23. (per)the car gets 25 miles \to the gallon das Auto verbraucht eine Gallone auf 25 Meilenthree parts oil \to one part vinegar drei Teile Öl auf einen Teil Essigthe odds are 2 \to 1 that you'll lose die Chancen stehen 2 zu 1, dass du verlierstshe awoke \to the sound of screaming sie wurden durch laute Schreie wachI like exercising \to music ich trainiere gerne mit MusikI can't dance \to this sort of music ich kann zu dieser Art Musik nicht tanzenthe band walked on stage \to rapturous applause die Band zog unter tosendem Applaus auf die Bühnethirty \to thirty-five people dreißig bis fünfunddreißig Leuteten \to the power of three zehn hoch drei27.▶ that's all there is \to it das ist schon alles▶ there's not much [or nothing] \to it das ist nichts Besonderes, da ist nichts Besonderes dabei1. (expressing future intention) zushe agreed \to help sie erklärte sich bereit zu helfenI'll have \to tell him ich werde es ihm sagen müssenI don't expect \to be finished any later than seven ich denke, dass ich spätestens um sieben fertig sein werdehe lived \to see his first grandchild er durfte erleben, dass sein erstes Enkelkind geboren wurdeI have \to go on a business trip ich muss auf eine Geschäftsreisethe company is \to pay over £500,000 die Firma muss über 500.000 Pfund bezahlenhe's going \to write his memoirs er wird seine Memoiren schreibenI have some things \to be fixed ich habe einige Dinge zu reparierenBlair \to meet with Bush Blair trifft Bushto be about \to do sth gerade etw tun wollen, im Begriff sein, etw zu tun2. (forming requests) zushe was told \to have the report finished by Friday sie wurde gebeten, den Bericht bis Freitag fertigzustellenhe told me \to wait er sagte mir, ich solle wartenI asked her \to give me a call ich bat sie, mich anzurufenwe asked her \to explain wir baten sie, es uns zu erklärenyou've not \to do that du sollst das nicht tunthat man is not \to come here again der Mann darf dieses Haus nicht mehr betretenyoung man, you're \to go to your room right now junger Mann, du gehst jetzt auf dein Zimmer3. (expressing wish) zuI need \to eat something first ich muss zuerst etwas essenI'd love \to live in New York ich würde nur zu gern in New York lebenwould you like \to dance? möchten Sie tanzen?that child ought \to be in bed das Kind sollte [schon] im Bett seinI want \to go now ich möchte jetzt gehenI need \to go to the bathroom ich muss mal auf die Toilettedo you want \to come with us? willst du [mit uns] mitkommen?I'd love \to go to France this summer ich würde diesen Sommer gern nach Frankreich fahren4. (omitting verb)are you going tonight? — I'm certainly hoping \to gehst du heute Abend? — das hoffe ich sehrwould you like to go and see the Russian clowns? — yes, I'd love \to möchtest du gern die russischen Clowns sehen? — ja, sehr gerncan you drive? — yes I'm able \to but I prefer not \to kannst du Auto fahren? — ja, das kann ich, aber ich fahre nicht gernit's not likely \to happen es ist unwahrscheinlich, dass das geschieht, das wird wohl kaum geschehenI was afraid \to tell her ich hatte Angst, es ihr zu sagenhe's able \to speak four languages er spricht vier Sprachenshe's due \to have her baby sie bekommt bald ihr BabyI'm afraid \to fly ich habe Angst vorm Fliegenshe's happy \to see you back sie ist froh, dass du wieder zurück bistI'm sorry \to hear that es tut mir leid, das zu höreneasy \to use leicht zu bedienenlanguages are fun \to learn Sprachenlernen macht Spaßit is interesting \to know that es ist interessant, das zu wissenthree months is too long \to wait drei Monate zu warten ist zu langI'm too nervous \to talk right now ich bin zu nervös, um jetzt zu sprechenI'm going there \to see my sister ich gehe dort hin, um meine Schwester zu treffenshe's gone \to pick Jean up sie ist Jean abholen gegangenmy second attempt \to make flaky pastry mein zweiter Versuch, einen Blätterteig zu machenthey have no reason \to lie sie haben keinerlei Grund zu lügenI have the chance \to buy a house cheaply ich habe die Gelegenheit, billig ein Haus zu kaufensomething \to eat etwas zu essenthe first person \to arrive die erste Person, die ankam [o eintraf]Armstrong was the first man \to walk on the moon Armstrong war der erste Mann, der den Mond betrat7. (expressing intent)we tried \to help wir versuchten zu helfen\to make this cake, you'll need... für diesen Kuchen braucht man...he managed \to escape es gelang ihm zu entkommenI don't know what \to do ich weiß nicht, was ich tun sollI don't know where \to begin ich weiß nicht, wo ich anfangen sollshe was wondering whether \to ask David about it sie fragte sich, ob sie David deswegen fragen solltecan you tell me how \to get there? könne Sie mir sagen, wie ich dort hinkomme?9. (introducing clause)\to tell the truth [or \to be truthful] um die Wahrheit zu sagen\to be quite truthful with you, Dave, I never really liked the man ich muss dir ehrlich sagen, Dave, ich konnte diesen Mann noch nie leiden\to be honest um ehrlich zu sein10. (in consecutive acts) um zuhe looked up \to greet his guests er blickte auf, um seine Gäste zu begrüßenshe reached out \to take his hand sie griff nach seiner Handthey turned around \to find their car gone sie drehten sich um und bemerkten, dass ihr Auto verschwunden warIII. ADVERBinv zuto come \to zu sich dat kommenthey set \to with a will, determined to finish the job sie machten sich mit Nachdruck daran, entschlossen, die Arbeit zu Ende zu bringen* * *[tuː]1. PREPOSITION1) = in direction of, towards zuto go to the doctor( 's)/greengrocer's etc — zum Arzt/Gemüsehändler etc gehen
to go to the opera/concert etc — in die Oper/ins Konzert etc gehen
to go to France/London — nach Frankreich/London fahren
to go to Switzerland —
to go to school to go to bed — zur Schule or in die Schule gehen ins or zu Bett gehen
he came up to where I was standing —
to turn a picture/one's face to the wall — ein Bild/sich mit dem Gesicht zur Wand drehen
2) = as far as, until bisto count (up) to 20 —
3) = in in (+dat)I have never been to Brussels/India — ich war noch nie in Brüssel/Indien
4)= secure to
he nailed it to the wall/floor etc — er nagelte es an die Wand/auf den Boden etcthey tied him to the tree —
5)to give sth to sb — jdm etw gebena present from me to you —
I said to myself... — ich habe mir gesagt...
he was muttering/singing to himself — er murmelte/sang vor sich hin
"To... " (on envelope etc) to pray to God — "An (+acc)..." zu Gott beten
6) in toasts auf (+acc)to drink to sb's health — auf jds Wohl (acc) trinken
7)= next to
with position bumper to bumper — Stoßstange an Stoßstangeclose to sb/sth — nahe bei jdm/etw
at right angles to the wall —
to the west (of)/the left (of) — westlich/links (von)
8) with expressions of time vorit was five to when we arrived — es war fünf vor, als wir ankamen
9) = in relation to zuA is to B as C is to D —
they won by 4 goals to 2 — sie haben mit 4:2 (spoken: vier zu zwei) Toren gewonnen
one person to a room — eine Person pro Zimmer
11) MATH3 to the 4th, 3 to the power of 4 — 3 hoch 4
12)= concerning
what do you say to the idea? — was hältst du von der Idee?to repairing television £30 (Comm) — (für) Reparatur eines Fernsehers £ 30
13)= according to
to the best of my knowledge — nach bestem Wissen14)= accompanied by
to sing to the guitar —to sing sth to the tune of... — etw nach der Melodie von... singen
to dance to a tune/a band — zu einer Melodie/den Klängen or der Musik eines Orchesters tanzen
15)= of
ambassador to America/the King of France — Botschafter in Amerika/am Hofe des Königs von Frankreich16)= producing
to everyone's surprise — zu jedermanns Überraschung17)to begin to do sth — anfangen, etw zu tunI want him to do it — ich will, dass er es tut
18)to see him now, one would never think... — wenn man ihn jetzt sieht, würde man nicht glauben,...19)infinitive expressing purpose, result
to eat/work to live —I did it to help you — ich tat es, um dir zu helfen
to get to the point,... — um zur Sache zu kommen,...
well, not to exaggerate... — ohne zu übertreiben,...
I arrived to find she had gone — als ich ankam, war sie weg
20)I don't want to — ich will nichtwe didn't want to but we were forced to — wir wollten nicht, aber wir waren dazu gezwungen
I intended to (do it), but I forgot (to) — ich wollte es tun, aber ich habe es vergessen
buy it, it would be silly not to — kaufe es, es wäre dumm, es nicht zu tun
he often does things one doesn't expect him to — er macht oft Dinge, die man nicht von ihm erwartet
21)__diams; noun/pronoun + to + infinitive he is not the sort to do that — er ist nicht der Typ, der das täte, er ist nicht der Typ dazuI have done nothing to deserve this — ich habe nichts getan, womit ich das verdient hätte
who is he to order you around? — wer ist er denn, dass er dich so herumkommandiert?
he was the first to arrive — er kam als Erster an, er war der Erste, der ankam
who was the last to see her? —
what is there to do here? —
now is the time to do it — jetzt ist die (beste) Zeit, es zu tun
you are foolish to try it — du bist dumm, das überhaupt zu versuchen
is it good to eat? —
he's too old to be still in short trousers — er ist schon so alt und trägt noch kurze Hosen
2. ADJECTIVEdoor (= ajar) angelehnt; (= shut) zu3. ADVERBto and fro — hin und her; walk auf und ab
* * *toA präp [tuː; tʊ; tə]1. (Grundbedeutung) zu2. (Richtung und Ziel, räumlich) zu, nach, an (akk), in (akk), auf (akk):go to London nach London fahren;from east to west von Osten nach Westen;throw sth to the ground etwas auf den oder zu Boden werfen3. in (dat):have you ever been to London?4. (Richtung, Ziel, Zweck) zu, auf (akk), an (akk), in (akk), für, gegen:that is all there is to it das ist alles;a cap with a tassel to it eine Mütze mit einer Troddel (daran);a key to the case ein Schlüssel für den oder zum Koffer;a room to myself ein Zimmer für mich (allein); → assistant B 1, end C 7, moral B 1, secretary 1, etcthe score is three to one (3-1) das Spiel oder es steht drei zu eins (3:1);two is to four as four is to eight zwei verhält sich zu vier wie vier zu acht8. (Ausmaß, Grenze, Grad) bis, (bis) zu, (bis) an (akk), auf (akk), in (dat):to the clouds bis an die Wolken;from three to four von drei bis vier (Uhr);it’s ten to five es ist zehn vor fünf10. (Begleitung) zu, nach:sing to a guitar zu einer Gitarre singen;a) betont:he gave the book to me, not to you! er gab das Buch mir, nicht Ihnen!b) unbetont:she was a good mother to him sie war ihm eine gute MutterB partikel [tʊ; tə]to go gehen;easy to understand leicht zu verstehen;she was heard to cry man hörte sie weinen2. (Zweck, Absicht) um zu, zu:he only does it to earn money er tut es nur, um Geld zu verdienenI weep to think of it ich weine, wenn ich daran denke;he was the first to arrive er kam als Erster;why blame you me to love you? obs oder poet was tadelst du mich, weil ich dich liebe?5. zur Andeutung eines aus dem Vorhergehenden zu ergänzenden Infinitivs:I don’t go because I don’t want to ich gehe nicht, weil ich nicht (gehen) willC adv [tuː]1. a) zu, geschlossen:pull the door to die Türe zuziehenb) angelehnt:3. SCHIFF nahe am Wind:keep her to!4. to and froa) hin und her,b) auf und ab* * *1.[before vowel tʊ, before consonant tə, stressed tuː] prepositiongo to work/to the theatre — zur Arbeit/ins Theater gehen
to Paris/France — nach Paris/Frankreich
3) (as far as) bis zufrom London to Edinburgh — von London [bis] nach Edinburgh
increase from 10 % to 20 % — von 10 % auf 20 % steigen
4) (next to, facing)5) (implying comparison, ratio, etc.)[compared] to — verglichen mit; im Vergleich zu
it's ten to one he does something — die Chancen stehen zehn zu eins, dass er etwas tut
6) introducing relationship or indirect objectto somebody/something — jemandem/einer Sache (Dat.)
lend/explain etc. something to somebody — jemandem etwas leihen/erklären usw.
relate to something — sich auf etwas (Akk.) beziehen
to me — (in my opinion) meiner Meinung nach
7) (until) bisfive [minutes] to eight — fünf [Minuten] vor acht
do something to annoy somebody — etwas tun, um jemanden zu ärgern
too young to marry — zu jung, um zu heiraten; zu jung zum Heiraten
he woke to find himself in a strange room — er erwachte und fand sich in einem fremden Zimmer wieder
he would have phoned but forgot to — er hätte angerufen, aber er vergaß es
2.she didn't want to go there, but she had to — sie wollte nicht hingehen, aber sie musste
[tuː] adverbbe to — [Tür, Fenster:] angelehnt sein
2) -
18 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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19 Bibliography
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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20 grasp
1. verb1) (to take hold of especially by putting one's fingers or arm(s) round: He grasped the rope; He grasped the opportunity to ask for a higher salary.) asir, agarrar; apretar, empuñar2) (to understand: I can't grasp what he's getting at.) captar, coger, comprender, entender
2. noun1) (a grip with one's hand etc: Have you got a good grasp on that rope?) asimiento, apretón; control, dominio2) (the ability to understand: His ideas are quite beyond my grasp.) entendimiento, comprensión, capacidad, conocimientos•- graspinggrasp vb1. agarrar / coger2. comprender / entendertr[grɑːsp]1 (grip, hold) asimiento, apretón nombre masculino3 (reach) alcance nombre masculino1 (seize - with hands) agarrar, asir; (opportunity, offer) aprovechar2 (understand) comprender, captar\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLto lose one's grasp on reality perder contacto con la realidadgrasp ['græsp] vt1) grip, seize: agarrar, asir2) comprehend: entender, comprendergrasp vito grasp at : aprovechargrasp n1) grip: agarre m2) control: control m, garras fpl3) reach: alcance mwithin your grasp: a su alcance4) understanding: comprensión f, entendimiento mn.• agarro s.m.• alcance s.m.• apretón s.m.• asimiento s.m.• comprensión s.f.• poder s.m.• puño s.m.v.• aferrar v.• agarrafar v.• agarrar v.• alcanzar v.• apañar v.• apresar v.• asir v.• empuñar v.
I
1. græsp, grɑːsp1)a) ( seize) \<\<object/person\>\> agarrar; \<\<opportunity/offer\>\> aprovecharb) ( hold tightly) tener* agarrado2) ( understand) \<\<concept\>\> captar
2.
vi
II
noun (no pl)1)a) ( grip)his grasp on my arm tightened, he tightened his grasp on my arm — me apretó más el brazo
b) ( reach) alcance m2) ( understanding) comprensión f; ( knowledge) conocimientos mpl[ɡrɑːsp]1. N1) (=handclasp) apretón m2) (fig) (=power) garras fpl, control m ; (=range) alcance m ; (=understanding) comprensión f2. VT1) (=take hold of) agarrar, asir; (=hold firmly) sujetar; [+ hand] estrechar, apretar; [+ weapon etc] empuñar2) (fig) [+ chance, opportunity] aprovechar; [+ power, territory] apoderarse de3) (=understand) comprender, entender- grasp at* * *
I
1. [græsp, grɑːsp]1)a) ( seize) \<\<object/person\>\> agarrar; \<\<opportunity/offer\>\> aprovecharb) ( hold tightly) tener* agarrado2) ( understand) \<\<concept\>\> captar
2.
vi
II
noun (no pl)1)a) ( grip)his grasp on my arm tightened, he tightened his grasp on my arm — me apretó más el brazo
b) ( reach) alcance m2) ( understanding) comprensión f; ( knowledge) conocimientos mpl
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